Why NATO Needs to Plan for Nuclear WarNATO°¡ ÇÙÀüÀïÀ» °èȹÇؾßÇÏ´Â ÀÌÀ¯As the alliance meets this week, leaders must discuss how they will react if Russia uses weapons of mass destruction.À̹ø ÁÖ µ¿¸ÍÀÌ ¸¸³ª¸é¼ ÁöµµÀÚµéÀº ·¯½Ã¾Æ°¡ ´ë·®»ì»ó¹«±â¸¦ »ç¿ëÇÒ °æ¿ì ¾î¶»°Ô ´ëÀÀÇÒÁö ³íÀÇÇØ¾ß ÇÑ´Ù.[foreignpolicy] 2022³â 10¿ù 12ÀÏ ¿ÀÈÄ 2½Ã 33ºÐ
NATO defense ministers will gather this week for a ministerial meeting, but one topic of discussion will be anything but routine: the risk that Russian President Vladimir Putin might use nuclear weapons in Europe. The recent massive, disproportionate missile attacks launched against Ukraine in response to the truck bombing of the Kerch Bridge reinforce the notion that the Kremlin remains unpredictable.³ªÅä ±¹¹æ Àå°üµéÀº À̹ø ÁÖ¿¡ Àå°ü ȸÀÇ¿¡ ¸ðÀÏ °ÍÀÌÁö¸¸, Ǫƾ ·¯½Ã¾ÆÀÌ À¯·´¿¡¼ ÇÙ¹«±â À§Çè ³íÀÇ´Â ÀÏ»óÀûÀÏ °ÍÀÌ´Ù. ÃÖ±Ù Äɸ£Ä¡ ´Ù¸®ÀÇ Æ®·° Æø°Ý¿¡ ´ëÀÀÇÏ¿© ¿ìÅ©¶óÀ̳ª¸¦ ÇâÇØ ¹ß»çµÈ ºÒ±ÕÇü ¹Ì»çÀÏ °ø°ÝÀ¸·Î Å©·½¸°ÀÌ ´©±¸¸¦ °Ü³ÉÇÏ°í ÀÖ´ÂÁö ¿¹ÃøÇÒ ¼ö ¾ø´Ù.Although Russian use of weapons of mass destruction (WMD) against non-nuclear Ukraine seems unlikely for several reasons, including the fact that it may frustrate Russia¡¯s broader goals, Western military officials can and must think through their potential responses. Doing so is inherently difficult given the many variables in play, but there are options that would punish Moscow and safeguard alliance interests without necessarily propelling the West up a nuclear escalation ladder.·¯½Ã¾Æ°¡ ºñÇÙ ¿ìÅ©¶óÀ̳ª¿¡ ´ë·® »ì»ó ¹«±â (WMD)¸¦ »ç¿ëÇÏ´Â °ÍÀº ·¯½Ã¾ÆÀÇ ±¤¹üÀ§ÇÑ ¸ñÇ¥°¡ ÁÂÀýµÇ°í ÀÖ´Ù´Â »ç½ÇÀ» Æ÷ÇÔ ¿©·¯ °¡Áö ÀÌÀ¯·Î °¡´É¼ºÀÌ Èñ¹ÚÇÏÁö¸¸ ¼¹æ ±º °ü°èÀÚ´Â ´ëÀÀÀ» »ý°¢ÇؾßÇÑ´Ù.±×·¸°Ô ÇÏ´Â °ÍÀº ¸¹Àº º¯¼öµéÀ» °í·ÁÇÒ ¶§ º»ÁúÀûÀ¸·Î ¾î·Á¿î ÀÏÀÌÁö¸¸, ¹Ýµå½Ã ¼¹æÀÌ ÇÙ È®´ë¸¦ ¹«·ÂÈÇÏÁö ¾Ê°íµµ ¸ð½ºÅ©¹Ù¸¦ ó¹úÇÏ°í µ¿¸Í ÀÌÀÍÀ» º¸È£ÇÒ ¼ö ÀÖ´Â ¼±ÅûçÇ×ÀÌ´Ù.The ministerial meeting in Brussels this week, which will include a meeting of the Ukraine Defense Contact Group, provides an opportunity for NATO allies and partners to gauge the trajectory of the conflict at a critical moment. Recent Ukrainian battlefield successes, Putin¡¯s partial mobilization, the Ukrainian attack on the Kerch Bridge, and widespread Russian retaliation striking critical infrastructure add up to a war with no end in sight.À̹ø ÁÖ ºê·ò¼¿¿¡¼ ¿¸®´Â ¿ìÅ©¶óÀ̳ª ±¹¹æȸÀÇ´Â ³ªÅä µ¿¸Í±¹µé°ú ÆÄÆ®³ÊµéÀÌ Áß¿äÇÑ ¼ø°£¿¡ ºÐÀïÀÇ ±ËÀûÀ» ÃøÁ¤ ÇÒ ¼öÀÖ´Â ±âȸ¸¦ Á¦°øÇÑ´Ù. ÃÖ±Ù ¿ìÅ©¶óÀ̳ª ÀüÀåÀÇ ¼º°ø, Ǫƾ ´ëÅë·ÉÀÇ ºÎºÐ µ¿¿ø, Å©¸³´ë±³¿¡ ´ëÇÑ ¿ìÅ©¶óÀ̳ªÀÇ °ø°Ý, ±¤¹üÀ§ÇÑ ·¯½Ã¾Æ º¸º¹ °ø°ÝÀº Áß¿äÇÑ ±â¹Ý ½Ã¼³À» °Å¸ÇÏ¿© ³¡ÀÌ º¸ÀÌÁö ¾Ê´Â ÀüÀïÀ¸·Î È®»êµÇ°í ÀÖ´Ù.Perhaps most importantly, Putin¡¯s illegal annexation of four Ukrainian regions; his reputation for rash, shortsighted behavior; and his nuclear saber-rattling have many on edge about an even more dramatic escalation of the conflict.¾Æ¸¶µµ °¡Àå Áß¿äÇÑ °ÍÀº Ǫƾ ´ëÅë·ÉÀÌ ¿ìÅ©¶óÀ̳ªÀÇ 4°³ Áö¿ªÀ» ºÒ¹ýÀûÀ¸·Î ÇÕº´Çß´Ù´Â °ÍÀÌ´Ù. °æ¼ÖÇÏ°í ±Ù½Ã¾ÈÀûÀÎ Çൿ¿¡ ´ëÇÑ ±×ÀÇ ¸í¼º; ±×¸®°í ±×ÀÇ ÇÙ ¹«·Â Ãæµ¹Àº ÈξÀ ´õ ±ØÀûÀÎ °¥µîÀÇ È®´ë¿¡ ´ëÇØ ¸¹Àº »ç¶÷µéÀÌ ±äÀåÇÏ°í ÀÖ½À´Ï´Ù.So far, Western governments have reportedly seen no evidence—such more trucks or trains appearing to move toward Ukraine from known storage locations—of Russian preparation for the use of nuclear weapons. For this reason, NATO defense ministers could merely continue to condemn the reckless and destabilizing Russian rhetoric regarding nuclear weapons.Áö±Ý±îÁö ¼¹æ Á¤ºÎ´Â ·¯½Ã¾Æ°¡ ÇÙ¹«±â »ç¿ëÀ» ÁغñÇÏ°í ÀÖ´Ù´Â Áõ°Å - ¾Ë·ÁÁø ÀúÀå Àå¼Ò¿¡¼ ¿ìÅ©¶óÀ̳ª·Î À̵¿ÇÏ´Â °Íó·³ º¸ÀÌ´Â Æ®·°À̳ª ±âÂ÷ -¸¦ º¸Áö ¸øÇß´Ù°í º¸µµÇß´Ù. ÀÌ·± ÀÌÀ¯·Î ³ªÅä ±¹¹æÀå°üµéÀº ÇÙ¹«±â¿¡ °üÇÑ ¹«¸ðÇÏ°í ºÒ¾ÈÁ¤ÇÑ ·¯½Ã¾ÆÀÇ ¹Ì»ç¿©±¸¸¦ °è¼Ó ºñ³ÇÒ ¼ö ¹Û¿¡ ¾ø´Ù.
While their use against a nuclear-armed foe might lead to uncontrolled escalation, it¡¯s unclear that this would occur against a nonaligned country without the ability to respond in kind—like Ukraine. So, it¡¯s possible there could be some military efficacy.ÇÙÀ¸·Î ¹«ÀåÇÑ Àû¿¡ ´ëÇÑ ±×µéÀÇ »ç¿ëÀº ÅëÁ¦µÇÁö ¾Ê´Â ¿¡½ºÄ÷¹À̼ÇÀ¸·Î À̾îÁú ¼ö ÀÖÁö¸¸, ¿ìÅ©¶óÀ̳ªÃ³·³ Çö¹°·Î ´ëÀÀÇÒ ´É·ÂÀÌ ¾ø´Â ºñµ¿¸Í ±¹°¡¿¡ ´ëÇØ ÀÌ·± ÀÏÀÌ ÀϾÁö´Â ºÒÈ®½ÇÇÏ´Ù. µû¶ó¼ ±º»çÀû È¿¿ë¼ºÀÌ ÀÖÀ» ¼öµµ ÀÖ´Ù.The bigger question is whether there would be any political efficacy. If Putin were to use nuclear weapons in the war, even if only for demonstrative purposes, he would likely further unify NATO and alienate his remaining friends in Europe. He would probably turn China, India, and much of the rest of the world against him. And he could make those areas of Ukraine that he attempted to annex uninhabitable for decades if not longer. From the outside, these all seem like highly undesirable outcomes for the Kremlin.´õ Å« ¹®Á¦´Â Á¤Ä¡Àû È¿¿ëÀÌ ÀÖÀ» °ÍÀΰ¡ ÇÏ´Â °ÍÀÌ´Ù. Ǫƾ ´ëÅë·ÉÀÌ ÀüÀï¿¡¼ ÇÙ¹«±â¸¦ »ç¿ëÇÑ´Ù¸é ºñ·Ï ½ÃÀ§ ¸ñÀûÀ¸·Î ¸¸ »ç¿ë µÇ´õ¶óµµ ±×´Â ³ªÅ並 ´õ¿í ÅëÀÏÇÏ°í À¯·´¿¡ ³²¾ÆÀִ ģ±¸µéÀ» ¸Ö¾îÁö°ÔÇÒ °ÍÀÌ´Ù. ±×´Â ¾Æ¸¶µµ Áß±¹, Àεµ, ±×¸®°í ¼¼°èÀÇ ¸¹Àº »ç¶÷µéÀ» ±×¿¡°Ô µîÀ» µ¹¸®°Ô ÇÒ °ÍÀÌ´Ù. ±×¸®°í ±×´Â ¿ìÅ©¶óÀ̳ªÀÇ ±× Áö¿ªµéÀ» ´õ ÀÌ»ó »ì ¼ö ¾ø´Ù¸é ¼ö½Ê ³â µ¿¾È °ÅÁÖÇÒ ¼ö ¾ø°Ô ¸¸µé ¼ö ÀÖ¾ú´Ù. °ÑÀ¸·Î º¸±â¿¡´Â ÀÌ ¸ðµç °ÍÀÌ Å©·½¸°¿¡°Ô ¸Å¿ì ¹Ù¶÷Á÷ÇÏÁö ¾ÊÀº °á°úó·³ º¸ÀδÙ.However, one area where the Kremlin may be willing to risk all that and more is in defense of Crimea. Illegally annexed in 2014 by Moscow, Crimea has a large Russian-speaking population that is generally sympathetic to Russia. It is also home to the strategically important Russian naval base at Sevastopol, which is the Russian Black Sea Fleet¡¯s home port, as well as other military infrastructure, such as Saki air base. Since 2014, Crimea has seen an exodus of ethnic Ukrainians and ±×·¯³ª Å©·½¸°ÀÌ ±× ¸ðµç °ÍÀ» ±â²¨ÀÌ °¨¼öÇÒ ¼ö ÀÖ´Â ÇÑ Áö¿ªÀº Å©¸²¹Ýµµ¸¦ ¹æ¾îÇÏ´Â °ÍÀÌ´Ù. 2014³â ¸ð½ºÅ©¹Ù¿¡ ÀÇÇØ ºÒ¹ýÀûÀ¸·Î ÇÕº´µÈ Å©¸²¹Ýµµ´Â ·¯½Ã¾Æ¿¡ ÀϹÝÀûÀ¸·Î µ¿Á¤ÀûÀÎ ·¯½Ã¾Æ¾î¸¦ »ç¿ëÇÏ´Â Àα¸°¡ ¸¹´Ù. ¶ÇÇÑ ·¯½Ã¾Æ ÈæÇØ ÇÔ´ëÀÇ º»°ÅÁö ÀÎ ¼¼ ¹Ù½º ÅäÆúÀÇ Àü·«ÀûÀ¸·Î Áß¿äÇÑ ·¯½Ã¾Æ Çرº±âÁö¿Í »çÅ° °ø±º±âÁö °°Àº ´Ù¸¥ ±º»ç ±â¹Ý ½Ã¼³ÀÇ º»°ÅÁöÀ̱⵵ ÇÕ´Ï´Ù. Å©¸²¹Ýµµ´Â 2014³âºÎÅÍ ¿ìÅ©¶óÀ̳ªÀεéÀÇ ÀÌÅ»À» ¸ñ°ÝÇß°í
Given all this at stake, it¡¯s likely Putin perceives Crimea as closer to the core of Russian vital interests than, say, the Kharkiv region, which was recently liberated by Ukrainian forces. If and when Ukrainian conventional military forces approach Crimea in hopes of liberating it, Putin may feel more tempted to use a nuclear weapon.ÀÌ ¸ðµç °ÍÀÌ À§ÅÂ·Î¿î »óȲ¿¡¼ ǪƾÀº Å©¸²¹Ýµµ°¡ ÃÖ±Ù ¿ìÅ©¶óÀ̳ª±º¿¡ ÀÇÇØ ÇعæµÈ Çϸ£Å°¿ì Áö¿ªº¸´Ù ·¯½Ã¾ÆÀÇ Áß¿äÇÑ ÀÌÀÍÀÇ Çٽɿ¡ ´õ °¡±õ´Ù°í ÀνÄÇÒ °¡´É¼ºÀÌ ³ô´Ù. ¿ìÅ©¶óÀ̳ª Àç·¡½Ä ±º»ç·ÂÀÌ Å©¸²¹Ýµµ¸¦ Çعæ½ÃÅ°±â À§ÇØ Å©¸²¹Ýµµ¿¡ Á¢±ÙÇÑ´Ù¸é ǪƾÀº ÇÙ¹«±â¸¦ »ç¿ëÇÏ°í ½ÍÀº À¯È¤À» ´õ ´À³¥Áöµµ ¸ð¸¥´Ù.Although the administration has rightly been vague in spelling out what that reconsideration might entail, one former government official recently speculated that Russia¡¯s use of nuclear weapons could prompt the United States and its allies to destroy Russian forces inside Ukraine.ÇàÁ¤ºÎ°¡ ±×·¯ÇÑ Àç°í°¡ ¼ö¹ÝµÉ ¼ö ÀÖ´Â ³»¿ëÀ» Á¤È®È÷ ¼³¸íÇÏ´Â µ¥ ÀÖ¾î ¸ðÈ£ÇÑ °ÍÀº »ç½ÇÀÌÁö¸¸, ÇÑ ÀüÁ÷ Á¤ºÎ °ü¸®´Â ÃÖ±Ù ·¯½Ã¾ÆÀÇ ÇÙ¹«±â »ç¿ëÀÌ ¹Ì±¹°ú ±× µ¿¸Í±¹µéÀÌ ¿ìÅ©¶óÀ̳ª ³»¿¡¼ ·¯½Ã¾Æ±ºÀ» Æı«Çϵµ·Ï ºÎÃß±æ ¼ö ÀÖ´Ù°í ÃßÃøÇß½À´Ï´Ù.Although U.S. officials have reportedly briefed allies on contingency plans in Washington, it¡¯s unclear if NATO itself has conducted an in-depth discussion or assessment of options. In an alliance that operates by consensus and given strong U.S. preferences to maintain a unified approach to Moscow, getting NATO on board is critical. It¡¯s important for alliance members to discuss potential alliance-wide responses now, rather than waiting until a crisis moment, and this week¡¯s meeting presents an ideal venue.¹Ì±¹ °ü¸®µéÀÌ µ¿¸Í±¹µé¿¡°Ô ¿ö½ÌÅÏÀÇ ºñ»ó °èȹ¿¡ ´ëÇØ ºê¸®ÇÎÇÑ °ÍÀ¸·Î ¾Ë·ÁÁ³Áö¸¸, ³ªÅä ÀÚü°¡ ½Éµµ ÀÖ´Â ³íÀdzª ¿É¼Ç Æò°¡¸¦ Çß´ÂÁö´Â ºÒºÐ¸íÇÏ´Ù. ÇÕÀÇ¿¡ ÀÇÇØ ¿î¿µµÇ°í ¸ð½ºÅ©¹Ù¿¡ ´ëÇÑ ÅëÀÏµÈ Á¢±Ù¹ýÀ» À¯ÁöÇÏ·Á´Â ¹Ì±¹ÀÇ °ÇÑ ¼±È£¸¦ ¹Þ´Â µ¿¸Í¿¡¼, ³ªÅ並 ½Â¼±½ÃÅ°´Â °ÍÀº ¸Å¿ì Áß¿äÇÏ´Ù.µ¿¸Í±¹µéÀÌ À§±âÀÇ ¼ø°£±îÁö ±â´Ù¸®±âº¸´Ù´Â Áö±Ý µ¿¸Í ÀüüÀÇ ÀáÀçÀû ´ëÀÀÀ» ³íÀÇÇÏ´Â °ÍÀÌ Áß¿äÇϸç, À̹ø ÁÖ È¸ÀÇ´Â ÀÌ»óÀûÀÎ Àå¼Ò¸¦ Á¦½ÃÇÑ´Ù.Ministers should begin by acknowledging that they have a collective, vital security interest in maintaining the taboo on nuclear weapons usage. Whether responding to a violation of that taboo would lead to immediate, direct allied military involvement in Ukraine is unclear, but ministers should be clear that such an attack would compel an unprecedented alliance response.Àå°üµéÀº ±×µéÀÌ ÇÙ¹«±â »ç¿ë¿¡ ´ëÇÑ ±Ý±â¸¦ À¯ÁöÇÏ´Â µ¥ ÀÖ¾î Áý´ÜÀûÀÌ°í Áß¿äÇÑ ¾Èº¸ ÀÌÀÍÀ» °¡Áö°í ÀÖ´Ù´Â °ÍÀ» ÀÎÁ¤ÇÏ´Â °ÍÀ¸·Î ½ÃÀÛÇØ¾ß ÇÑ´Ù. ±× ±Ý±â¸¦ À§¹ÝÇÏ´Â °Í¿¡ ´ëÀÀÇÏ´Â °ÍÀÌ ¿ìÅ©¶óÀ̳ª¿¡ Áï°¢ÀûÀÌ°í Á÷Á¢ÀûÀÎ ¿¬ÇÕ±ºÀÇ °³ÀÔÀ¸·Î À̾îÁúÁö´Â ºÒºÐ¸íÇÏÁö¸¸, Àå°üµéÀº ±×·¯ÇÑ °ø°ÝÀÌ Àü·Ê ¾ø´Â µ¿¸ÍÀÇ ´ëÀÀÀ» °¿äÇÒ °ÍÀ̶ó´Â °ÍÀ» ºÐ¸íÈ÷ ÇØ¾ß ÇÑ´Ù.What might the menu of next steps include? There are too many variables at play to identify with precision if, where, or how the allies might respond to a Russian nuclear attack on Ukraine. Ideally, any set of responses should entail severe punishment of Moscow and the specific individuals who authorized and conducted the nuclear attack. It should also try to minimize the risk of escalating the conflict further along WMD lines. And it should seek to reestablish the taboo by leaving open the possibility of additional options as a way of deterring another Russian use of WMD.´ÙÀ½ ´Ü°èÀÇ ¸Þ´º¿¡´Â ¹«¾ùÀÌ Æ÷Ç﵃ ¼ö ÀÖ½À´Ï±î? µ¿¸Í±¹µéÀÌ ¿ìÅ©¶óÀ̳ª¿¡ ´ëÇÑ ·¯½Ã¾ÆÀÇ ÇÙ °ø°Ý¿¡ ´ëÀÀÇÒ ¼ö ÀÖ´ÂÁö, ¾îµð¼, ¶Ç´Â ¾î¶»°Ô ´ëÀÀÇÒ ¼ö ÀÖ´ÂÁö¸¦ Á¤È®ÇÏ°Ô ÆľÇÇϱ⿡´Â ³Ê¹« ¸¹Àº º¯¼ö°¡ ÀÖ´Ù. ÀÌ»óÀûÀ¸·Î, ¾î¶² ÀÏ·ÃÀÇ ´ëÀÀµµ ¸ð½ºÅ©¹Ù¿Í ÇÙ °ø°ÝÀ» ½ÂÀÎÇÏ°í ½ÇÇàÇÑ Æ¯Á¤ °³Àε鿡 ´ëÇÑ ¾öÁßÇÑ Ã³¹úÀ» ¼ö¹ÝÇØ¾ß ÇÑ´Ù. ¶ÇÇÑ WMD ¶óÀÎÀ» µû¶ó °¥µîÀÌ ´õ¿í °íÁ¶µÉ À§ÇèÀ» ÃÖ¼ÒÈÇϵµ·Ï ³ë·ÂÇØ¾ß ÇÑ´Ù.±×¸®°í ¶Ç ´Ù¸¥ ·¯½Ã¾ÆÀÇ ´ë·®»ì»ó¹«±â »ç¿ëÀ» ÀúÁöÇϱâ À§ÇÑ ¹æ¹ýÀ¸·Î Ãß°¡ ¿É¼ÇÀÇ °¡´É¼ºÀ» ¿¾îµÒÀ¸·Î½á ±Ý±â¸¦ ÀçÁ¤¸³ÇÏ´Â ¹æ¾ÈÀ» ¸ð»öÇØ¾ß ÇÑ´Ù.Within this broad framework, the alliance could consider several options if Russia were to unleash a nuclear weapon against Ukraine. First, NATO could consider further augmenting its presence in Eastern, Northeastern, and Southeastern Europe at sea, in the air, and on land.ÀÌ ³ÐÀº Ʋ ¾È¿¡¼, ·¯½Ã¾Æ°¡ ¿ìÅ©¶óÀ̳ª¿¡ ÇÙ¹«±â¸¦ ¹ß»çÇÑ´Ù¸é, µ¿¸ÍÀº ¸î °¡Áö ¼±ÅûçÇ×À» °í·ÁÇÒ ¼ö ÀÖÀ» °ÍÀÌ´Ù. ù°, NATO´Â ¹Ù´Ù, °øÁß ¹× À°Áö¿¡¼ µ¿ºÎ, ºÏµ¿ºÎ ¹× ³²µ¿ºÎ À¯·´¿¡¼ÀÇ ÀÔÁö¸¦ ´õ¿í °ÈÇÏ´Â °ÍÀ» °í·ÁÇÒ ¼ö ÀÖ½À´Ï´Ù.Additionally, NATO could eliminate remaining inhibitions on providing the kinds of equipment to Ukraine that it has been reluctant to hand over thus far. Foremost among these might be longer-range precision artillery, advanced Western tanks, and advanced combat jets. (Air defenses are reportedly already en route.) Furthermore, NATO could authorize and coordinate cyberattacks against critical dual-use Russian infrastructure used to support or finance the war effort. And the allies could begin to seize Russian assets abroad, owned by both the Russian government and individuals directly involved in WMD use, using them to finance recovery in Ukraine.°Ô´Ù°¡, NATO´Â Áö±Ý±îÁö ¿ìÅ©¶óÀ̳ª¿¡ ³Ñ°ÜÁÖ´Â °ÍÀ» ²¨·Á¿Ô´ø Àåºñ Á¾·ù¸¦ Á¦°øÇÏ´Â °Í¿¡ ´ëÇÑ ³²Àº ¾ïÁ¦¸¦ ¾ø¾Ù ¼ö ÀÖÀ» °ÍÀÌ´Ù. ÀÌ Áß °¡Àå Áß¿äÇÑ °ÍÀº Àå°Å¸® Á¤¹Ð Æ÷º´, °í±Þ ¼¾ç ÅÊÅ© ¹× °í±Þ ÀüÅõ Á¦Æ®±âÀÏ ¼ö ÀÖ½À´Ï´Ù. (°øÁß ¹æ¾î´Â ÀÌ¹Ì ÁøÇà ÁßÀ̶ó°í ÇÑ´Ù.)¶ÇÇÑ NATO´Â ÀüÀï ³ë·ÂÀ» Áö¿øÇϰųª ÀÚ±ÝÀ» Á¶´ÞÇÏ´Â µ¥ »ç¿ëµÇ´Â Áß¿äÇÑ ÀÌÁß ¿ëµµ ·¯½Ã¾Æ ÀÎÇÁ¶ó¿¡ ´ëÇÑ »çÀ̹ö °ø°ÝÀ» ½ÂÀÎÇÏ°í Á¶Á¤ÇÒ ¼ö ÀÖ½À´Ï´Ù.±×¸®°í µ¿¸Í±¹µéÀº ·¯½Ã¾Æ Á¤ºÎ¿Í ´ë·®»ì»ó¹«±â »ç¿ë¿¡ Á÷Á¢ °ü¿©ÇÏ´Â °³ÀεéÀÌ ¼ÒÀ¯ÇÏ°í ÀÖ´Â ·¯½Ã¾Æ ÀÚ»êÀ» ¿ìÅ©¶óÀ̳ªÀÇ º¹±¸ ÀÚ±ÝÀ¸·Î »ç¿ëÇϱ⠽ÃÀÛÇÒ ¼ö ÀÖ´Ù.
Other steps could include more direct operational support of Ukrainian forces, such as by embedding military personnel in Ukrainian units. This could be aimed at facilitating advice; providing training and field support for more advanced Western weapons; further easing and speeding the flow of intelligence; and helping in target identification on the battlefield.´Ù¸¥ ´Ü°è¿¡´Â ¿ìÅ©¶óÀ̳ª ºÎ´ë¿¡ ±º»ç ¿ä¿øÀ» Æ÷ÇÔ½ÃÅ°´Â °Í°ú °°ÀÌ ¿ìÅ©¶óÀ̳ª ±º¿¡ ´ëÇѺ¸´Ù Á÷Á¢ÀûÀÎ ÀÛÀü Áö¿øÀÌ Æ÷Ç﵃ ¼ö ÀÖ½À´Ï´Ù. ÀÌ°ÍÀº Á¶¾ðÀ» ¿ëÀÌÇÏ°Ô ÇÏ´Â °ÍÀ» ¸ñÇ¥·ÎÇÒ ¼ö ÀÖ½À´Ï´Ù. º¸´Ù Áøº¸µÈ ¼±¸ ¹«±â¿¡ ´ëÇÑ ÈÆ·Ã ¹× ÇöÀå Áö¿ø Á¦°ø; Áö´ÉÀÇ È帧À» ´õ¿í ¿ÏÈÇÏ°í °¡¼ÓÈÇÑ´Ù. ÀüÀå¿¡¼ Ç¥Àû ½Äº°À» µ½´Â´Ù.In a similar vein, the alliance could conduct clandestine military operations within Russian-occupied Ukraine, including sabotage and aiding resistance forces. And if the alliance wanted to pursue horizontal escalation, it could consider similar clandestine military operations in Russian-occupied Moldova and Russian-occupied Georgia.ºñ½ÁÇÑ ¸Æ¶ô¿¡¼, µ¿¸ÍÀº ·¯½Ã¾Æ°¡ Á¡·ÉÇÑ ¿ìÅ©¶óÀ̳ª ³»¿¡¼ »çº¸Å¸ÁÖ¿Í ÀúÇ×±ºÀ» µ½´Â °ÍÀ» Æ÷ÇÔÇÑ ºñ¹Ð ±º»çÀÛÀüÀ» ¼öÇàÇÒ ¼ö ÀÖ´Ù. ±×¸®°í ¸¸¾à µ¿¸ÍÀÌ ¼öÆòÀû ¿¡½ºÄ÷¹À̼ÇÀ» Ãß±¸Çϱ⸦ ¿øÇÑ´Ù¸é, ·¯½Ã¾Æ°¡ Á¡·ÉÇÑ ¸ôµµ¹Ù¿Í ·¯½Ã¾Æ°¡ Á¡·ÉÇÑ ±×·çÁö¾ß¿¡¼µµ À¯»çÇÑ ºñ¹Ð ±º»çÀÛÀüÀ» °í·ÁÇÒ ¼ö ÀÖÀ» °ÍÀÌ´Ù.In sum, there are many responses NATO can and should consider in the event of Russian WMD use that would not necessarily lead to a spiraling nuclear conflagration. Deliberating those options now is wise so they are ready and available should NATO¡¯s leaders need them. Moreover, examining possible alliance-wide responses to a Russian nuclear attack on Ukraine would help achieve two other important goals.¿äÄÁ´ë, ·¯½Ã¾ÆÀÇ ´ë·®»ì»ó¹«±â »ç¿ëÀÌ ±ÞÁõÇÏ´Â ÇÙÆø¹ß·Î À̾îÁöÁö ¾ÊÀ» °æ¿ì ³ªÅä°¡ °í·ÁÇÒ ¼ö ÀÖ°í °í·ÁÇØ¾ß ÇÒ ¸¹Àº ¹ÝÀÀµéÀÌ ÀÖ´Ù. ±×·¯ÇÑ ¿É¼ÇµéÀ» Áö±Ý ½ÉÀÇÇÏ´Â °ÍÀº Çö¸íÇϱ⠶§¹®¿¡ ³ªÅäÀÇ ÁöµµÀÚµéÀÌ ±×°ÍµéÀ» ÇÊ¿ä·Î ÇÒ °æ¿ì ±×°ÍµéÀ» ÁغñÇÏ°í ÀÌ¿ëÇÒ ¼ö ÀÖ´Ù.°Ô´Ù°¡, ¿ìÅ©¶óÀ̳ª¿¡ ´ëÇÑ ·¯½Ã¾ÆÀÇ ÇÙ °ø°Ý¿¡ ´ëÇÑ µ¿¸Í Â÷¿øÀÇ ´ëÀÀ °¡´É¼ºÀ» °ËÅäÇÏ´Â °ÍÀº ´Ù¸¥ µÎ °¡Áö Áß¿äÇÑ ¸ñÇ¥¸¦ ´Þ¼ºÇÏ´Â µ¥ µµ¿òÀÌ µÉ °ÍÀÌ´Ù.First, it would prepare both allied leaders and citizens for such a crisis. Although NATO remains a nuclear alliance, some European allies have long preferred to see nuclear weapons relegated to the background when it comes to allied defense. And second, just indicating that NATO was conducting a robust assessment of possible responses would signal to Moscow that WMD use would bring not only greater U.S. involvement but also broad-based European action.ù°, ±×°ÍÀº µ¿¸Í±¹ ÁöµµÀÚµé°ú ½Ã¹Îµé ¸ðµÎ¿¡°Ô ±×·¯ÇÑ À§±â¿¡ ´ëºñÇÒ °ÍÀÌ´Ù. NATO´Â ¿©ÀüÈ÷ ÇÙ µ¿¸ÍÀ¸·Î ³²¾Æ ÀÖÁö¸¸, ÀϺΠÀ¯·´ µ¿¸Í±¹µéÀº µ¿¸Í±¹ ¹æ¾î¿¡ °üÇÑ ÇÑ ÇÙ¹«±â°¡ ¹è°æÀ¸·Î ¹Ð·Á³ª´Â °ÍÀ» ¿À·§µ¿¾È ¼±È£ÇØ ¿Ô´Ù.±×¸®°í µÑ°, ³ªÅä°¡ °¡´ÉÇÑ ´ëÀÀ¿¡ ´ëÇÑ °·ÂÇÑ Æò°¡¸¦ ¼öÇàÇÏ°í ÀÖ´Ù´Â °ÍÀ» º¸¿©ÁÖ´Â °Í¸¸À¸·Îµµ ´ë·®»ì»ó¹«±â »ç¿ëÀÌ ¹Ì±¹ÀÇ °³ÀÔ»Ó¸¸ ¾Æ´Ï¶ó ±¤¹üÀ§ÇÑ À¯·´ÀÇ ÇൿÀ» °¡Á®¿Ã °ÍÀ̶ó´Â ½ÅÈ£¸¦ ¸ð½ºÅ©¹Ù¿¡ º¸³¾ °ÍÀÌ´Ù.[foreignpolicy] https://foreignpolicy.com/2022/10/12/nato-ukraine-plan-nuclear-war-putin/
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